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ABSTRACT
This article is envisioned as a first step in a comprehensive 
analysis of the European Union’s (EU) industrial base, designed to 
inform the current debate, and future policy decisions regarding 
deindustrialisation and reindustrialisation in the EU. We focus on 
the study of deindustrialisation and productivity, to determine the 
causes of deindustrialisation and its relation to productivity in the 
EU, and whether it can be explained primarily as a natural process, 
or alternatively as a negative economic trend. Our results indicate 
that the main causes of deindustrialisation in the EU were shifting 
demand patterns caused by rising GDP per capita, followed by 
growing international trade which corroborates the hypothesis that 
the process is natural. In the second part we take a closer look at 
manufacturing productivity as an integral cause of deindustrialisation. 
We analyse the impact of market dynamics, concentration and firm 
size on manufacturing productivity, where we find evidence which 
supports the conclusion that a higher level of market dynamics 
increases productivity, while firm size and market concentration seem 
to decrease industry productivity.
1. Introduction
Deindustrialisation is a well-researched phenomenon that began in the second half of the 
twentieth century in developed countries. Since then it has spread to developing countries 
as well (primarily in Eastern Europe and South America), making it a global, almost all 
encompassing phenomenon. Before the crisis of 2008, the prevailing opinion was that it 
was simply a by-product of successful economic development. Interfering with the pro-
cess, especially by using industrial policies or strategies, was frowned upon by neoclassical 
orthodoxy. However, after the crisis the prevailing opinion shifted. Rodrik (2009) was one 
of the first to openly support industrial policies in the aftermath, seeing them as a necessity 
in the event of market failures. Countries gradually started shifting their focus more and 
more toward industrial performance, and previously dormant ideas that stressed the link 
between manufacturing and overall economic growth again began to see the light of day. 
The term ‘reindustrialisation’ could be heard in increasing frequency. In light of these events, 
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The policy is described in detail in the ‘Communication on industrial policy’ (European 
Commission, 2014). It calls for a thorough modernisation and reindustrialisation of the 
EU’s industrial base, focusing on highly adaptive, technologically advanced and productive 
industries.
In this context, we believe a systematic analysis of both deindustrialisation and pro-
ductivity in an EU context is needed. Following this reasoning, this article consists of two 
parts, and is structured as follows. In the first part we attempt to analyse and determine the 
causes of deindustrialisation in the EU. By doing so we hope to further the discussion on 
the determinants of deindustrialisation that was primarily based on research on the OECD 
countries, by using EU data. This research is important because it establishes whether 
deindustrialisation in the EU can be seen as a naturally occurring process, or as a symptom 
of an underperforming industrial sector. In the second part we take a closer look at manu-
facturing productivity as an integral cause of deindustrialisation, as well as a key indicator 
of reindustrialisation. Because of its central role in both processes, we analyse the impact 
of market dynamics, firm concentration and firm size on manufacturing productivity. This 
central role of productivity consists of the fact that increased productivity usually results in 
a decrease of the number of workers employed, which is basically synonymous with dein-
dustrialisation. Reindustrialisation on the other hand is characterised by growth of highly 
productive technologically advanced industries with above average value-added per worker.
2. Deindustrialisation
Deindustrialisation is usually defined either as an absolute or relative (to total employment) 
decrease of employment in industry, or as a decrease of the share of industry in GDP/value 
added GDP (Rowthorn & Ramaswamy, 1997; Sachs, Shatz, Deardorff, & Hall, 1994). Both 
of these measures can be criticised. The problem with decreasing industrial employment 
as a measure of deindustrialisation is that it is theoretically possible (if productivity is high 
enough) for it to coexist with rising industrial output and/or share in GDP, where it would 
then be highly debatable to categorise a country experiencing such economic developments 
as ‘deindustrialisation’. This problem is of course solved by using the share of industry in 
GDP as a measure of deindustrialisation, but then we encounter difficulties of a different 
kind. The main one is changing prices. If for example manufacturing prices were to decrease 
while at the same time the market experiences a rise in prices in the service sector, this would 
translate into a falling share of manufacturing in GDP without any change in output or num-
ber of persons employed, which again, could hardly be characterised as deindustrialisation.
The second problem seems to us to be larger than the first. While it is debatable whether 
a country with decreasing employment in industrial activities but increasing industrial out-
put is actually deindustrialising, in our opinion it is not debatable whether a country that 
isn’t experiencing a drop in industrial output or employment is deindustrialising – it is not. 
Therefore, like the majority of research done on this subject (Kollmeyer, 2009; Krugman, 
1996; Rowthorn & Ramaswamy, 1999), we opt for industrial employment as the variable 
of choice when discussing deindustrialisation.
However it is measured, there is no escaping the fact that in the last few decades deindus-
trialisation has been experienced by virtually all developed countries, and also by a growing 
number of developing countries. Since it implies major long-term structural changes, it has 
been a subject of great interest to economists. Consequently, a large (and growing) body 
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of literature has been devoted to the subject, trying to pinpoint and explain the size, scope, 
and causes of this phenomenon.
2.1. Causes and determinants
As a first step, the causes of deindustrialisation can be roughly divided into two categories: 
internal to the country in question, and external to it.
The first authors who wrote on the subject of deindustrialisation concentrated on internal 
causes. Clark (1957) theorised that as an economy gets more advanced, after a certain point 
it will experience a systematic shift in demand from manufactured goods to services. This 
explanation assumes changing income elasticity’s for manufactured goods as per capita GDP 
increases. At lower levels of GDP per capita, income elasticity for manufactured goods is 
assumed to be high, but starts to decrease as GDP per capita rises, and the share of income 
devoted to manufactured goods loses ground to services. This of course does not necessarily 
mean that household expenses on manufactured goods decrease in absolute terms, although 
this was proposed by sociologist Daniel Bell (1976), who from a psychological perspective 
argued that when a population becomes (from their point of view) sufficiently equipped 
with industrial goods, they turn their attention to services.
A different approach was taken by Baumol (1967) who argued that the root cause of 
deindustrialisation is a higher productivity growth rate in the industrial sector as opposed 
to the service sector. By this logic, even assuming a constant level of output in both sectors, 
higher productivity in manufacturing implies fewer workers are needed for maintaining 
the same level of output, which then leads to the excess workforce becoming unemployed, 
and presumably eventually gravitating toward the service sector. However, interestingly 
Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1999) point out that the exact consequences of higher relative 
productivity of manufacturing are theoretically somewhat ambiguous, since in addition to 
decreasing work needed for maintaining the same level of output, rising productivity should 
lower the relative price of manufactured goods, thereby increasing demand for them, which 
in turn should lead to more workers being employed in manufacturing. Consequently, in 
order for deindustrialisation to occur, the former effect has to be stronger than the latter, 
perhaps due to demand for manufactured goods not increasing because of reasons stated 
in the previous passage.
As for external causes, the large-scale decrease of employment in manufacturing in the 
past few decades has coincided with tremendous growth in trade between developed and 
developing countries, making North–South trade the primary suspect in the search for 
causes of deindustrialisation.
There are two avenues by which changes in trade patterns can cause deindustrialisation, 
and both have to do with specialisation. The first is tied to long-term economic policy, 
where countries focus on developing certain sectors of their economy which they think 
will maximise growth. If, for example, a country has a deficit in raw materials, food, energy, 
etc. it will be more inclined to specialise in manufacturing and the production of sophisti-
cated products, and use the revenues gained from exporting such products to finance the 
import of whatever it is they lack. Another example would be developing countries that 
target certain sectors of the economy which they think will have the highest impact on GDP 
growth. In socialist countries this was mostly heavy industry, and in more recent times, we 
have the Asian tigers with their strong focus on electronics. Thus, increasing specialisation 
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connected with increasing globalisation, will necessitate a shift in certain countries away 
from manufacturing, which will lead to deindustrialisation.
The second avenue has to do with specialisation within manufacturing. The trend in 
recent times has been that developed countries will increasingly specialise in sophis-
ticated manufactured products which require a small number of high skilled workers, 
while developing countries will specialise in less skill-intensive industries which yield 
products of a lesser degree of sophistication. Thus, labour intensive industries in devel-
oped countries will lose ground to labour-intensive industries in developing countries, 
and the corresponding loss of employment in labour-intensive industries will not be 
absorbed by the skill-intensive industries, due to their low labour requirements. In the 
end, this will result in a net loss of labour in manufacturing, which is precisely how 
industrialisation is defined.
These three phenomenona (the shift in demand, the rise of productivity and the shift 
in trade patterns) are considered to be the dominant causes of deindustrialisation. A few 
others are mentioned in the existing literature that usually do not carry as much explanatory 
weight. Among these are: fixed investments and simple statistical redefining.
The amount of fixed investments made by the private sector is theoretically a substantial 
factor in determining the size of the manufacturing sector. Since a large portion of private 
investments is usually reserved for manufacturing it follows that if the marginal propen-
sity to save declines in a given population (due to for example: recession), manufacturing 
employment will tend to fall as well, leading to deindustrialisation.
What is meant by ‘simple statistical redefining’ is a reclassification in official statistical 
databases of certain industries from ‘manufacturing’ to ‘services’. This occurs because of, 
again, increasing specialisation, where manufacturing firms outsource a number of links 
in their production chain to outside contractors who specialise in such services, whereby 
these links are then reclassified as services, leading to a statistical drop in workers employed 
in manufacturing, where, in fact, there is none.
2.2. Empirical analysis
All of the empirical research involving the causes of deindustrialisation agrees that, in 
essence, there are three causes worth considering when discussing deindustrialisation. 
These are: a shift in consumer demand, rising productivity, and increasing globalisation 
(NorthS–outh trade).
The point of contention is whether the most important factors are internal (as maintained 
by Kollmeyer, 2009; Krugman & Lawrence, 1993; Krugman, 1996; Rowthorn & Ramaswamy, 
1999; Rowthorn & Coutts, 2004), or connected to North–South trade (as maintained by 
Kucera & Milberg, 2003; Sachs et al., 1994; Saeger, 1997; Wood, 1995).
And of the internal causes, which is more important: the shift in consumer demand , or 
rising productivity? In our study we are primarily interested in deindustrialisation in the 
EU. Since most of the above studies are by now 10-years-old (or more), we hope to further 
this discussion with more recent data. In addition, all of the aforementioned studies have 
been conducted using data on 18–23 OECD countries from the OECD database, while we 
are primarily interested in deindustrialisation within the EU, therefore we deviate from this 
norm by using data on EU-27 countries.
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2.2.1. Data, variables and methods
Our data was obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI), and Eurostat (for data 
on labour productivity). Regarding the method of analysis, since we are looking for causes 
of deindustrialisation of EU-27 countries, the natural way to represent our data is in panel 
format. Our cross-section element is therefore comprised of 27 EU member states. Our 
time series is 18 years, from 1995 to 2012, which, after accounting for missing data brings 
us to a total of 357 observations. Our equation is as follows:
 
Where industryemp is industrial employment, calculated as a percentage share of total 
employment, GDPpc is GDP per capita, labprodeurostat is labour productivity calculated as 
an index, trade represents the share of import plus export in GDP, Unemrate is the unem-
ployment rate of the overall economy, and Growthr is the growth rate of the overall economy. 
Summary statistics of the variables used in equation (1) are given in Table 4
GDPpc and squared GDPpc are supposed to account for Clark’s (1957) effect of shifting 
demand for industrial products, where the expected result is that higher levels of GDP per 
capita should in the beginning lead to larger shares of industrial employment in the econ-
omy (which is accounted for with the variable GDPpc), but in later stages of development 
rising GDP per capita is expected to have the opposite effect on industrial employment 
(accounted for with squared GDPpc). The variable labprodeurostat (labour productivity) 
is here to account for Baumol’s (1967) effect of rising productivity, which assumes that 
productivity growth is higher in manufacturing than in other sectors of the economy, and 
therefore should lead to a decrease in industrial employment.1 The variable trade is envi-
sioned as a direct measure of the effects of shifting trade patterns, where increasing trade 
connections should in theory lead to a decrease in industrial employment, either by way 
of between country specialisation, or within country specialisation.
Various control variables were experimented with, including: Foreign direct investment 
(FDI), Gross capital formation (GCF), unemployment rate, GDP growth rate, and a dummy 
EU variable to account for the fact that some countries are not EU members throughout 
the entire sample. Of these, only the unemployment and GDP growth rates were included 
in the final regression, since all the other mentioned variables proved to be statistically 
insignificant in every model used.
The majority of the empirical work mentioned earlier (especially the work done in the 
1990s) used pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) as the primary regression method. This 
article aims to improve upon the statistics by using the standard three models of static panel 
analysis in the estimation of the above equation: pooled OLS, random-effects model and 
fixed-effects model. Additionally, a version of a robust fixed-effect model that clusters the 
error terms around the time variable was used as the fourth model (Fixed CE). It is designed 
to give better results in the presence of heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence 
as described in Hoechle (2007). These methods should in theory prove superior to pure 
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2.3.2. Results
Our overall results are presented in Table 1, as well as the results of tests for random effects, 
autocorrelation, Hausmann test, heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence. The 
results of the various tests suggest the presence of cross-sectional dependence and hetero-
scedasticity but not of autocorrelation, so a fifth model (Fixed CE) was used, which is (as 
described above) essentially a robust version of the fixed-effects model designed to address 
the specific set of specification problems that were encountered. The results of the tests also 
suggest that the random-effects model is superior both to pooled OLS and fixed-effects 
models, so we consider it to be the most correct specification of the five.
The results of the random-effects model indicate that the strongest negative effect on 
industrial employment was Clark’s (1957) effect of rising GDP per capita, which leads to an 
average drop of industrial employment of 0, 18% when increased by 1%. This is followed 
closely by international trade, which when increased by 1% leads to an average drop of 
0.17% in industrial employment. Productivity as a cause of deindustrialisation comes in 
last, as it decreases industrial employment only by 0.12% when increased by 1%. As far 
as the debate between internal and external causes goes, the results indicate that internal 
causes (GDPpc, and productivity) have a larger effect on deindustrialisation than external 
(trade), as argued by Krugman and Lawrence (1993), Krugman (1996), Rowthorn and 
Ramaswamy (1999), Rowthorn and Coutts (2004) and Kollmeyer (2009). Furthermore, the 
results indicate that Clark’s effect seems to be stronger than Baumol’s, that is, GDP growth 
seems to have a stronger effect on deindustrialisation than rising productivity, which is in 
agreement with the findings of Kollmeyer (2009).
Table 1. Regression results of equation (1).





(1) (2) (3) (4)
vaRiaBLEs oLs Random Fixed FixedcE
lnGDPpc 2.691*** 3.272*** 3.383*** 3.383***
(0.262) (0.247) (0.253) (0.315)
sqlnGDPpc −0.147*** −0.178*** −0.182*** −0.182***
(0.0136) (0.0128) (0.0135) (0.0176)
Lntrade −0.0146 −0.168*** −0.207*** −0.207***
(0.0199) (0.0273) (0.0324) (0.0333)
lnlabprodeurostat −0.158** −0.117*** −0.119** −0.119*
(0.0661) (0.0398) (0.0586) (0.0668)
lnUnemrate −0.0256 −0.120*** −0.117*** −0.117***
(0.0222) (0.0123) (0.0145) (0.0239)
lnGrowthr 0.00299 0.0208*** 0.0212*** 0.0212***
(0.00880) (0.00335) (0.00332) (0.00559)
constant −7.956*** −10.02*** −10.52*** −10.52***
(1.268) (1.161) (1.190) (1.370)
observations 357 357 357 357
R-squared 0.507 0.639 0.639
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The results are overall in agreement with the literature, and point to the conclusion that 
a large portion of EU deindustrialisation can be explained as a by-product of successful 
economic growth (evidenced by rising GDP per capita and productivity). In other words: 
a natural process.
3. Productivity
There are two key words that constantly ‘pop-up’ while reading the ‘Communication on 
industrial policy’ (2014), and these are: competitiveness and reindustrialisation. Since both 
are tightly linked with productivity (which was also a significant variable in our analysis of 
deindustrialisation), in this section we will take a closer look at productivity. Specifically, 
we are interested in how industry dynamics, firm and industry size will affect industrial 
productivity. As far as the link between firm size and productivity is concerned, the majority 
of recent papers conclude that larger firms will on average be more productive (Van Ark & 
Monikoff, 1996; Van Bieseboreck, 2005; Leung, Meh, & Terajima, 2008; Snodgrass & Biggs, 
1996). This falls in line with the Schumpeterian view that large monopolistic firms are the 
true engine of growth as opposed to the classical view that industries with small firms and 
strong competition should exhibit the fastest productivity growth.
The link between industry size and dynamics with productivity however, is found 
to be in line with classical assumptions, where most of the papers on the subject find 
a positive effect of industry dynamics and overall increased level of competition on 
productivity (Bartelsman & Doms, 2000; Dune, Klimek, & Schmitz, 2008; De Loecker, 
2009; Syverson, 2004; Schmitz, 2005). Since industry size (or industry concentration) 
is essentially a proxy for the level of competition, we expect that the reduction of the 
number of firms in an industry should on average lead to decreasing productivity in the 
industry. However, there is some evidence that the causal relationship between industry 
concentration and productivity is not so simple, but that although increasing concentra-
tion leads to higher productivity, there exists a threshold after which the effect becomes 
negative (Gopinath, Pick, & Li, 2002).
3.1. Data, variables and methods
Since we are interested in how industry dynamics, firm size, and industry size affect produc-
tivity at the industrial level, our cross-section element are manufacturing industries of EU-27 
countries in the period 2008–2013, which translates to 1807 distinct observations. Our data 
source is Eurostat. The term ‘industry’ refers to the standard NACE Rev.2. classification 
of industrial activities at the two-digit level of aggregation, where ‘C’ is the manufacturing 
sector, comprised of 24 separate industries (C10-C33). Additionally, since Eurostat’s data 
on business demography is available only in a certain format (which aggregates a part of the 
original 24 industries to 15 industries) we follow the same classification. The 15 industries 
in question are given in Table 2.
Since we cannot take both countries and individual industries as our cross-section ele-
ment, we decided on the approach to simply treat each industry in each country as com-
pletely separate entities (for example, the textile industry in Germany is considered as a 
separate unit of analysis from the textile industry of any other country in the sample, and 
from every other industry in the same country). In short, our cross-section element is 
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Where β0 is the constant term, labprod is labour productivity for a given industry, nbr 
encompasses the net birth rate of firms2 in a given industry, invpp stands for investment 
per person, pemp is number of persons employed, noe stands for number of enterprises, 
and pc for personnel costs. We are interested in how industry dynamics (accounted for 
by dynamics), firm size (accounted for by pemp) and industry size (accounted for by noe) 
affect industry productivity, while invpp and pc are included as control variables. Summary 
statistics of all the variables used in equation (2) are given in Table 5.
3.2. Results
Our overall results are presented in Table 3, with the results of tests for random effects, 
autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and of the Hausmann test. The results of the various 
tests suggest the presence of autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and possibly cross-sectional 
dependence,3 so a fifth (FixedCE) and sixth (PW) model were used. The ‘Fixed CE’ (clustered 
error) model is used in the case of the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, 
while the ‘PW’ (Prais-Winsten regression) model is used to account for the presence of 
cross-sectional dependence (if any), as recommended by Hoechle (2007). Since virtually all 
of the tested models show the same sign in all the variables (if not intensity), we can conclude 
that industry dynamics, investments per person, and personnel costs all have a positive effect 
on labour productivity, while the number of firms and employees in an industry have a 
(2)











ln(noei,t) + 5ln(pci,t) + 
Table 2. nacE rev. two-digit classification.
source: authors (adapted from Eurostat’s business demography statistics).
Industry NACE rev.2 classification Label
1 c10-c12 manufacture of food products; beverages and tobacco products
2 c13-c14 manufacture of textiles and wearing apparel
3 c15 manufacture of leather and related products
4 c16 manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
5 c17-c18 manufacture of paper and paper products; printing and reproduction of 
recorded media
6 c19 manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
7 c20-c21 manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; basic pharmaceutical 
products and pharmaceutical preparations
8 c22 manufacture of rubber and plastic products
9 c23 manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
10 c24-c25 manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machin-
ery and equipment
11 c26-c27 manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products; manufacture of 
electrical equipment
12 c28 manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
13 c29-c30 manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers and of other transport 
equipment
14 c31-c32 manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing
15 c33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
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negative effect on that industry’s productivity. Taken together, the positive effect of industry 
dynamics and negative effects of firm and industry size are somewhat perplexing. Under 
the standard classical assumptions more competition should lead to higher productivity, so 
Table 3. Regression results of equation (2).





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
vaRiaBLEs oLs Random Fixed FixedcE PW
nbr 0.169 0.782*** 0.908*** 0.908** 0.499**
(0.194) (0.135) (0.137) (0.411) (0.241)
lninvpp 0.264*** 0.182*** 0.0769*** 0.0769** 0.213***
(0.00783) (0.0116) (0.0165) (0.0329) (0.0142)
lnpemp −0.685*** −0.646*** −0.402*** −0.402*** −0.663***
(0.0148) (0.0266) (0.0592) (0.148) (0.0222)
lnnoe −0.0124* −0.0342*** −0.234*** −0.234** −0.0206**
(0.00693) (0.0130) (0.0558) (0.105) (0.0104)
lnpc 0.741*** 0.740*** 0.640*** 0.640*** 0.745***
(0.0118) (0.0213) (0.0471) (0.104) (0.0188)
constant 5.721*** 5.682*** 5.535*** 5.535*** 5.638***
(0.0789) (0.138) (0.566) (1.291) (0.133)
observations 1,807 1,807 1,807 1,807 1,807
R-squared 0.827 0.177 0.177 0.908






Table 4. summary statistics of variables used in equation (1).
source: authors.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
lnindustry~p 471 3.314802 .2165199 2.517696 3.763523
lnGDPpc 506 9.846658 .8074398 7.763865 11.38187
sqlnGDPpc 506 97.60734 15.5491 60.27761 129.5469
lntrade 504 4.532847 .4454097 3.611653 5.917387
lnlabprode~t 481 4.56764 .1466147 4.065602 5.065124
lnUnemrate 474 2.071356 .4416576 .6418539 3.314186
lnGrowthr 425 1.031839 .9264945 −4.590463 2.504156
Table 5. summary statistics of variables used in equation (2).
source: authors.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
lnindustry~p 471 3.314802 .2165199 2.517696 3.763523
lnGDPpc 506 9.846658 .8074398 7.763865 11.38187
sqlnGDPpc 506 97.60734 15.5491 60.27761 129.5469
lntrade 504 4.532847 .4454097 3.611653 5.917387
lnlabprode~t 481 4.56764 .1466147 4.065602 5.065124
lnUnemrate 474 2.071356 .4416576 .6418539 3.314186
lnGrowthr 425 1.031839 .9264945 −4.590463 2.504156
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the expected result would be that industry size and dynamics should have a positive effect, 
while firm size should have a negative effect on industry productivity. The Schumpeterian 
view on the other hand is that the engine of productivity growth is located primarily in 
large monopolistic firms, which means we should expect a positive effect of firm size, and a 
negative effect of industry size on productivity. As we have shown, our results corroborate 
neither possibility completely, which suggests that in the EU the causal links between these 
variables are more subtle and complex, and in our opinion warrant further investigation 
(perhaps in line with the attempt of Gopinath, Pick, and Li [2002]).
4. Conclusion
In our investigation of deindustrialisation within the EU, in the context of the European 
Commission’s call for smart reindustrialisation through focusing on competitiveness and 
productivity, we opted for a two layered approach.
First, we attempted to ascertain the main driving forces of deindustrialisation and their 
respective strength. We concluded that rising GDP per capita had the strongest effect on 
deindustrialisation within EU-27 countries in the period 1995–2012, followed by increasing 
trade volume, and lastly by productivity, which suggests that deindustrialisation in the EU 
is primarily caused by the natural process of gravitating toward the service sector, which is 
experienced by all advanced economies.
As our next step, we took a closer look at productivity. Specifically we tried to ascertain 
the effects of firm size, industry size and industry dynamics on productivity in the EU-27 
in the period 2008–2013. Our results indicate that firm and industry size have a negative 
effect, while industry dynamics have a positive effect on productivity, suggesting a more 
complicated causal relationship between these variables than is expected from the viewpoint 
of a straightforward Schumpeterian-classical dichotomy.
This article is viewed as a first step in a comprehensive analysis of the EU’s industrial base, 
designed to inform the current EU debate on deindustrialisation and reindustrialisation. 
We feel it would be useful for further analysis to focus on disentangling the theoretically 
somewhat perplexing results obtained in our research regarding the relationship between 
firm size, industry size, industry dynamics and their relationship with productivity. This 
could perhaps be achieved by conducting the analysis on a smaller, more homogenous 
sample (with individual countries, or groups of countries with similar characteristics).
Notes
1.  Note that the ideal measure here would be manufacturing or industrial productivity, but 
that data is unavailable for the period in question. Instead we concluded that overall labour 
productivity will serve as a satisfactory proxy variable, since we assume that the vast majority 
of overall productivity growth within a country comes from manufacturing (industrial) 
productivity growth, rather than productivity growth in services.
2.  Calculated as: (No. of birth of enterprises - No. of deaths of enterprises) / No. of enteprises.
3.  Since our sample contains a fair amount of missing observations, and thus creates a highly 
unbalanced panel, we were unable to perform standard tests for cross-sectional dependence 
(Pesaran's, Friedman's and Free's).
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA  1001
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
References
Bartelsman, E. J. & Doms, M. (2000). Understanding productivity: Lessons from longitudinal 
microdata. Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 569–594.
Baumol, W. J. (1967). Macroeconomics of unbalanced growth: The anatomy of urban crisis. The 
American Economic Review, 57, 415–426.
Bell, D. (1976). The coming of post-industrial society. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Clark, C. (1957). The conditions of economic progress. London: MacMillan.
De Loecker, J. (2009). Product differentiation, multi-product firms and estimating the impact of 
trade. Working Paper, Princeton University.
Dune, T., Klimek, S., & Schmitz, J. A. (2008). Does foreign fompetition spur productivity? Evidence 
from post WWII U.S. cement manufacturing. Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
European Commission. (2014). Communication from the commission to the European parliament, the 
council, the European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions for a European 
industrial renaissance. Brussells: European Commission.
Gopinath, M., Pick, D., & Li, Y. (2002, July 28–31). Does industrial concentration raise productivity in 
food industries? 2002 annual meeting, Western Agricultural Economics Association, Long Beach, 
CA. No. 36634.
Hoechle, D. (2007). Robust standard errors for panel regressions with cross-sectional dependence. 
The Stata Journal, 3, 281–312.
Kollmeyer, C. (2009). Explaining deindustrialization: How affluence, productivity growth, and 
globalization diminish manufacturing employment. American Journal Of Sociology, 114, 1644–
1744. 
Krugman, P. (1996). Domestic distortions and the deindustrialization hypothesis. NBER Working 
Paper Series.
Krugman, P., & Lawrence, R. (1993). Trade, jobs and wages. NBER Working Paper Series.
Kucera, D. & Milberg, W. (2003). Deindustrialization and changes in manufacturing trade: Factor 
content calculations for 1978-1995. Review of World Economics, 139, 602–624.
Leung, D., Meh, C., & Terajima, Y. (2008). Are there Canada-U.S. differences in SME financing. 
Mimeo.
Rodrik, D. (2009). Industrial policy; Don’t ask why. Ask How. Middle East Development Journal, 
1(1), 1–29. 
Rowthorn, R. & Coutts, K. (2004, May). De-industrialization and the balance of payments in advanced 
economies. UNCTAD Discussion Paper, 1-26.
Rowthorn, R. & Ramaswamy, R. (1999). Growth, trade, and deindustrialization. IMF Staff Papers, 
46, 18–41.
Rowthorn, R. & Ramswamy, R. (1997). Deindustrialization - Its causes and implications. Washington, 
DC: IMF.
Sachs, J. D., Shatz, H. J., Deardorff, A., & Hall, R. E. (1994). Trade and jobs in US manufacturing. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1–84.
Saeger, S. S. (1997). Globalization and deindustrialization: Myth and reality in the OECD. 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 133, 580–608.
Schmitz, J. A. (2005). What determines productivity? Lessons from the dramatic recovery of U.S. 
and Canadian iron ore industries following their early 1980s crisis. Journal of Political Economy, 
113, 582–625. 
Snodgrass, D. R. & Biggs, T. (1996). Industrialization and the small firm: Patterns and policies. San 
Francisco: International Center for Economic Growth.
Syverson, C. (2004). Market structure and productivity: A concrete example. Journal of Political 
Economy, 112, 1181–1222. 
1002   L. ŠKUFLIĆ AND M. DRUŽIĆ
Van Ark, B. & Monikoff, E. (1996). Size distribution of output and employment: A data set for 
manufacturing industries in five OECD countries, 1960s-1990. OECD Economics Department 
Working Paper No. 166. 
Van Bieseboreck, J. (2005). Firm size matters: Growth and productivity growth in African 
manufacturing. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 53, 546–583.
Wood, A. (1995). How trade hurt unskilled workers. Journal of Economic Perspectives -, 9, 57–80. 
